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Abstract— With the appearance of new Internet services like
Voice over IP and IP television, malwares are in the way to update
and extend their targets. In this paper, we discuss the emergence
of a new generation of malwares attacking VoIP infrastructures
and services. Such malwares constitute a real threat to the
currently deployed VoIP architectures without strong security
measures in place. We present one implemented environment that
can be used to evaluate such attacks. Our “VoIP bots” support
a wide set of attacks ranging from SPIT to DDoS and are tested
against several VoIP platforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware is the general term grouping softwares designed
to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the owner’s
informed consent. A worm is a special type of malware that
can run on its own and propagate itself to other machines. An
attacker using worms and other infection mechanisms to install
bots on vulnerable machines is called bot herder or bot master.
Upon their bootstrap, the compromised machines or Zombies
connect themselves to their master to receive command input
and execute attack operations. In many scenarios, the bot
master rents time on the botnet (network of bots under a com-
mon control infrastructure) to a third party which orientates
them to launch Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS)
and massive SPAM. Botnets pose a severe threat to today’s
Internet. Over the recent years, botnets have become a popular
and profitable market. Since April 2007 when the government
and private web servers in Estonia were the target of a large
DDoS, “cyberwar” is no more science fiction.
With the growing of new Internet technologies like VoIP,
it is expected that botnets will play the same malicious role.
VoIP services are well exposed to such threats since they are
open and have to be reachable. Values of interest within a VoIP
enterprise domain include signaling and media infrastructure,
accounting directories, PBX services (voice mailboxes, gate-
ways), individual user accounts, the internal networks running
other services. Attacks can be transmitted across gateways
to integrated networks like mobile and traditional telephony
ones. Conversely, compromising VoIP applications constitutes
a bridge to bypass security mechanisms and attack internal
networks. Currently, some researchers argue that SKYPE -
which is the most deployed peer to peer VoIP application-
could be a backdoor [1]. SIP (Session Initiation Protocol -
RFC 3261) -which is the de-facto standard signaling protocol-
is a strong candidate to become the UFBP (Universal Firewall
Bypass Protocol) or the universal payload injector. This is as-
Fig. 1. VoIP Botnet Framework
sessed after the discovery of many cross-site scripting (XSS)1
and SQL injection attacks2 due to SIP vulnerabilities. To be
effective however, these vulnerabilities have to be exploited
over a large distributed framework. A botnet seems perfectly
adequate for this task.
In this paper, we present such a framework of VoIP bot
and botnet in the context of SIP. Our bots are not equipped
with propagation mechanisms so they don’t represent a real
threat value; rather than being used for research purposes. The
overlay network of our framework is depicted in Figure 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: In Section II we
introduce the SIP protocol. We illustrate our bot architecture in
Section III and we enumerate many attack scenarios in Section
IV. We discuss implementation issues in Section V. In Section
VI we debate the related work and we conclude the paper in
Section VII.
II. SIP BACKGROUND
SIP is emerging as the future standard for Internet telephony
signaling because of the following strength points [2]:
• SIP is professionally developed by the IETF (Internet
Engineering Task Force) to be scalable over Internet and
utilizing Internet standards and capabilities (e.g. DNS,
URL support, Wireless);
• SIP is text based with heritage from HTTP and SMTP,
so it can be easily scripted, logged and inspected;
1http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2007/Oct/0174.
html
2http://voipsa.org/pipermail/voipsec_voipsa.org/
2007-October/002466.html
Fig. 2. SIP Call Establishment
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• SIP has presence and instance messaging capabilities
presenting a high potential to invent new applications in
the future;
• SIP is well supported by the industry: it has been adopted
by mobile operators in their third generation networks and
services;
• SIP takes advantage of Internet security mechanisms
as encryption, authentication, integrity and certificates,
even if it inherits a large set of vulnerabilities from the
underlying data networks from another side.
Basically, SIP allows two communicating parties to set
up, modify and terminate a phone call. SIP is a request-
response transaction-based protocol. A SIP Dialog is com-
posed of one or more transactions. The SIP addressing
scheme is based on URIs (Uniform Resource Identifier)
e.g. sip:user@host:port;parameters. Proxy servers
help routing SIP messages. A basic call initiation scenario is
depicted in Figure 2.
III. VOIP BOT ARCHITECTURE
Our bot architecture is shown in Figure 3. The stack of dif-
ferent protocols provides the bot with an application interface
to use these protocols. The SIP stack is responsible for sending
and receiving, manufacturing and parsing SIP messages. The
RTP stack is responsible for coding and decoding, compressing
and expanding, encapsulation and demultiplexing of media
flows. Other stacks can be supported as well. For example,
the STUN [3] protocol is useful to bypass NAT.
The communication agent allows the bot to exchange
information and commands with the attacker. Most of the
known botnets use IRC (Internet Relay Chat - RFC 1459)
or peer-to-peer (P2P) networks for their control and command
architecture. IRC is mainly designed for group communication
and allows one-to-one communication (private discussion) as
well. A channel (or a room) is supported by multiple servers
building an application level spanning tree among them and
relaying IRC messages between room visitors. P2P refers to
a class of systems and applications that employ distributed
resources to perform a function in a decentralized manner
[4]. Bot masters moved towards P2P networks because of
their high degree of anonymity and privacy. For example in
Freenet [5], when a peer sends a message, the peer identity is
rewritten as the message is relayed among a chain of peers.
Another example is the Lucent Personalized Web Assistant
(LPWA) [6] which acts as a proxy server and allows consistent
untraceable aliases for clients from servers. A LPWA client
opens an account and is recognized upon returning to this
account while his true identity is hidden from the server. The
Slapper worm [7] which builds a P2P overlay network has
advanced features like reliable end to end message delivery,
coping with network partitions and reshaping, and anonymous
message delivery.
The data retrieval component allows the bot to retrieve
different kinds of data (e.g. list of VoIP extensions (URIs),
advertising audio files, list of default passwords to try, SIP
messages to shoot, etc ... ) using a data communication proto-
col (e.g. FTP or HTTP Client). Web servers using a dynamic
DNS server (i.e. the DNS changes the IP corresponding to the
web server over time) are preferred to avoid being tracked.
The exploit retrieval component allows the bot to retrieve
specific exploits against vulnerabilities and software flaws in
VoIP products. The damage of such exploits ranges from
remote DoS on the target (similar to a ping of death) to remote
eavesdropping3. Cross script attacks and data base injection
vectors can be carried by malformed SIP messages to attack
embedded web servers in the targeted products and databases
querying theses messages for accounting and statistics. Some
exploits are stateless (consisting on shooting one SIP message)
but others are stateful (based on the state machine of the
target). Stateful attacks are formed by a series of messages
where the content and the sending time of each message
depends from the previous sent message and the corresponding
reaction or response of the target to that message. For example,
a stateful remote DoS on a Cisco 7940 SIP Phone4 has been
discovered using the KIF stateful fuzzer [8]. The bot master
uses some format to describe stateful exploits and upload them
to a server where they can be found by the bot. The bot parses
the exploit description and builds a local state machine to
perform the attack.
The encryption engine enables the bot to create digest
3http://www.voipsa.org/pipermail/voipsec_voipsa.
org/2007-August/002424.html
4http://www.voipsa.org/pipermail/voipsec_voipsa.
org/2007-August/002422.html
authentication from credentials when authentication is required
in the process of an attack or an attempt of registration.
Typical use of this engine is password cracking and CPU-
based flooding against the target’s authentication procedure.
The SIP state machine manages the operations of the bot
with respect to the commands issued by the attacker. The
mission of the bot as set by the attacker drives its behavior
upon occurrence of SIP events (i.e. receiving a SIP request
RequestEvent or a SIP response ResponseEvent) and
TimeOut events. The transition from a state to another is
constrained by predicates on a set of global and local variables.
For example, when receiving a 200 OK message that belongs
to some existing dialog, the bot’s next step is based on the
Cseq method (which determines the method the 200 OK is
in response for) and on the global attack parameters (mission,
target IP, target SIP port ...).
Based on this architecture, different attack scenarios are
possible as detailed in the next section.
IV. ATTACK SCENARIOS
SPIT
SPIT or SPAM over Internet Telephony refers to unsolicited
calls intended for advertising or social engineering. Automated
calls have already been used a couple of times like for example
in the 2008 American presidential election.5
In a SPIT scenario, the attacker asks the bot to deliver
an audio record to one or more destination URI. Similarly
to e-mails being used in SPAM, URIs can be collected by
web crawlers or in result to a VoIP domain enumeration. The
bot manufactures an INVITE request carrying an SDP body,
giving arguments like the destination URI, its IP address, its
RTP port, the codec to be used and other media attributes.
When the call is answered, the bot retrieves the audio record
from the location as supplied by the attacker (e.g. from a URL
or a local file in the compromised machine) and stream it to
the callee.
Flooding
Flooding attacks target the signaling plane elements (e.g.
proxy, gateway, etc.) with the objective to take them down
or to limit their quality, reliability and availability. Flooding
attacks can be categorized regarding their destination and their
strategy. Whether the attack is destined to a valid URI in the
target domain, a non existent URI in the target domain, a URI
with an invalid domain or IP address, an invalid URI in another
domain, or a valid URI in another domain, different damages
are produced. The strategy is related to the nature of messages
used during the attack: legitimate, malformed (carrying some
exploits), invalid (non compliant to the SIP standard), and
spoofed SIP messages (spoofed From and Contact header).
Other attacks are targeted against the authentication process
by using messages carrying valid nonces and requiring the
target to compute digests which overwhelm its CPU capacity
5http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/23/robo.
calls/index.html
[9]. In a flooding scenario, the bot starts a thread which sends
continuously request messages (INVITE or REGISTER) given
the destination, the duration, the timing and the strategy as
supplied by the attacker. Distributed flooding attacks can be
easily organized by involving and synchronizing a number of
bots.
Enumeration
Enumeration is the process of discovering valid SIP ex-
tensions (or URIs) in a SIP domain. Enumeration is usually
preceded by a port scan to identify existent SIP proxies and
user agents. The standard port used by SIP is 5060. The first
step of enumeration is to identify if the SIP service is running
on that port and what type and version of server is there.
This is done by sending a simple OPTIONS message and
interpreting its response. The searched information is usually
found in the Server or the User-Agent header.
In an enumeration scenario, the bot retrieves a list of
extensions/URIs from a specified location, then it probes
them using INVITE, REGISTER or OPTIONS messages.
OPTIONS enumeration is preferable since it is stealthier (it
does not ring the phones, nor raise suspicions about the
registration process). The bot has to match each request
with the response it triggered based on the call-ID and/or
transaction identifier. It analyzes the response to determine 1)
if the dialed extension exists and is registered to the target, 2)
exists and is temporarily unavailable, or 3) doesn’t exist at all.
The interpretation of responses depends on the target’s type
and version. For example, if the target carries an OpenSER
sip proxy (version 1.1.1-notls) fingerprint, the
response to an OPTIONS message destined to an extension is
interpreted as follows: a “200 OK” means that the extension
exists and it is registered, a “404 NOT FOUND” means that
the extension is invalid, but a received “100 TRYING” before
a final error response means that the extension is valid but not
available for the moment.
Cracking
Remote brute force password cracking consists in repeatedly
trying guesses for an account’s password using INVITE or
REGISTER requests. Unchanged default passwords of de-
ployed VoIP platforms make them strongly vulnerable to such
attacks. In a cracking scenario, the bot has to discover the
registration or the voicemail password for a user name. Note
that the user name used in the authentication process is not
always the same as the one in the user’s URI (which can
be obtained by enumeration). The attacker has to know the
user name or the voice mail extension before going to a brute
force attack. The bot retrieves a list of default passwords
corresponding to the target platform. For each guess, it sends
a first REGISTER (or INVITE) asking for a challenge. An
error response from the target gives him back a nonce. The bot
calls its encryption engine to build a new request containing
credentials based on the challenge and the temporal nonce.
The target’s final response decides if the guess was right or
not.
Fingerprinting
Remote fingerprinting allows the attacker to identify the
type and the version of the SIP target platform. The simplest
method consists on sending an OPTIONS message and extrac-
tion of the manufacturer string from its response. This process
can be fooled if the manufacturer string was intentionally
falsified. Smarter fingerprinting schemes as described in [10]
or in [11] can be supported as well. In a fingerprinting
scenario, the bot is asked to fingerprint one or range of SIP
extensions. The bot has to send back its results to the attacker
or -in order to not disclose him- to put them in a specified
location where he can access them later.
Exploiting Specific Vulnerabilities
In an exploit attack scenario, the bot is either given the
platform of the target or has to discover it by itself (by
fingerprinting). The bot connects to an exploit server and
retrieves a set of possible exploits corresponding to the target
fingerprint. Each exploit should be tagged with some meta-data
so the bot can choose the exploit which meets the attacker’s
aim. In case of stateful attacks, the bot builds a local attack
state machine to execute the attack given local and remote
parameters as reported by the attacker.
Interception and Modification
These attacks require an access to the internal network in
the VoIP domain. If the attacker succeeds to compromise a
machine inside the VoIP domain, many interception, eaves-
dropping, modification and man in the middle attacks are
possible using ARP poisoning techniques. It is not just media
and signaling traffic which is targeted, but also supporting
protocols like DNS, DHCP, ICMP, and TFTP. In one scenario,
if the bot knows the IP address of a phone and the IP address
of the outbound SIP proxy, it can fool the phone into thinking
that it is the proxy (by sending an RTP packet with the
IP address of the proxy and the MAC address of the bot)
and vice versa. Like that, the bot plays an MITM role by
watching and forwarding messages between the two entities.
Because typically no data integrity is deployed in current SIP
implementations, the MITM can change an INVITE request
before forwarding it. For example, it can redirect the call
towards an IVR (Interaction Voice Response) to do Vishing
(VoIP Phishing) scam.
Fraudulent Calls
The increasing financial and informational value of VoIP
will attract more Internet hackers into attacking VoIP mid-
dlewares, take control over them and execute remote code.
Future scenarios are to ask the compromised phone to dial an
overtaxed number (similarly to the modem-based dialers in the
near past) or to record all calls. Terms like “VoIP dialer” or
“VoIP logger” are going to appear in the near future. A one
million dollar idea arises immediately: let a large number of
victims (one million) dial an overtaxed number resulting on
only one additional dollar on the monthly bill of each caller.
Most of the victims will not complain about.
Fig. 4. Screen view of the bot master
Propagation
Propagation models of worms exploiting VoIP and mobile
vulnerabilities and using directories in the compromised plat-
forms to spread up are discussed in [12]. By its fingerprinting,
exploit retrieving and executing capabilities, our bot consti-
tutes a basis for such a worm using an algorithm like the
following one:
Forall uri in PhoneBook
fingerprint = Bot.Fingerprint(uri);
exploit = Bot.
retrieve_exploit(fingerprint);
Bot.send_exploit (exploit, uri);
Bot.upload_version(uri);
End_Forall
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
We implemented a proof-of-concept worm-free IRC bot
based on SIP and RTP using the JAVA language. For SIP
we used the Jain SIP library [13]; for RTP we used the
JMF library[14] and for IRC we used the PircBot library6.
Our code is available under an open source license [15].
The bot is currently able to perform DoS, SPIT, SCAN,
CRAK, FINGEPRINT, SHOOT, EXPLOIT and REGISTER
functionalities. Moreover, the bot master is able to perform
a collective suicide of all the bots. The screenshot of Figure
4 shows the IRC client (Xchat7) of the bot master upon the
connection of one bot.
Deployed on an Intel Pentium 4 CPU 3.40GHz and 2G
RAM memory machine running a Linux kernel 2.6.18-1, the
6http://www.jibble.org/javadocs/pircbot/index.html
7http://www.xchat.org/
bot is able to send around 10,000 messages per second with
different call-Ids. The call-ID seed is the number of the bot
as set by the attacker. Messages from different bots have
different Call-Ids. We used a similar machine with 3G RAM
memory to be the target (hosting Asterisk and OpenSER8).
Using legitimate messages and non existent URI destination,
one bot is able to raise the target CPU to 100% in case of
both Asterisk and OpenSER, and 2 bots are able to saturate the
bandwidth of a LAN connection (about 12 MBytes/s). Asterisk
consumes 25% of the host system memory (i.e. 750 MB)
after 100 seconds of attack (i.e. 0.25% raise in memory/s),
while OpenSER memory consumption depends on the number
of child processes as configured by the administrator (Each
child reserves a 33 MB memory space). OpenSER integrates
a defense module against flooding attacks called PIKE. PIKE
blocks an IP address for a period p after receiving a number Th
coming from that address during a prefixed sampling period
s.
In order to perform a flooding against a PIKE-protected
OpenSER, a number of bots should be synchronized. The
first step is to discover the PIKE parameters. We propose the
scheme of Figures 5 and 6.
We need only 1+p/s bots to continuously deny the service
at the proxy. A first bot starts the attack and is blocked after
the first sampling period, the other p/s bots, each by turn,
assure the attack until the first bot is unblocked again. For
sake of simplicity, a scheme using only three bots is depicted
in Figure 7.
Several flooding mitigation mechanisms are currently pro-
posed ([16], [17], [18], [19]). However, our bots are able to
bypass such mechanisms at least from a theoretical point of
8The project has evolved in two parallel projects OpenSIPS and Kamailio
Fig. 5. Discovering the s Parameter
Fig. 6. Discovering the p Parameter
Fig. 7. Attacking a PIKE-protected system
view. Threshold-based systems can be deceived by fine-tuned
the flooding rates. Learning-based systems can be “poisoned”
by inserting specially crafted data points so that the model of
“normality” drifts into the direction of an attack vector [20].
VI. RELATED WORKS
Computer viruses and malwares [21] pose a serious threat
to the computer network infrastructures of our society. Logic
bombs, Trojan horses, backdoors, spywares and worms should
be studied for their different aspects to enhance our protection,
intrusion detection and prevention. With the emergence of
VoIP, many vulnerabilities have been discovered through secu-
rity testing of SIP implementations [22] that can be exploited
by such malwares.
Appropriate security approaches have been well investigated
to increase the immunity of this new technology. An early
warning system has been published in [23]. A holistic intrusion
detection solution based on event and alert correlation is
described in [24]. This paper uses a different approach since
it adopts the attacker’s perspective and therefore provides
an assessment tool to feedback currently deployed security
architectures.
A number of similar tools are already available9. SIPp10 is a
9http://www.voipsa.org/Resources/tools.php
10http://sipp.sourceforge.net/
SIP traffic generator providing basic call flow scenarios while
allowing more complex scenarios to be described using XML.
Sipsak11 is a command line tool that can be used for simple
SIP tests. C07-SIP12 is a byproduct of the PROTOS project
providing a group of tests against SIP parsers. SIPSendFun13
is a set of php scripts to send spoofed SIP messages. Skora14
wrote several Perl scripts demonstrating different attacks such
as BYE and CANCEL attacks. Our VoIP bot is novel with
respect to these tools because of its numerous functionalities
and the ability it gives to manage distributed attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a framework of VoIP-specific
malware using bots installed on compromised machines and
we showed how different attack scenarios can be supported by
such a framework. We presented a prototype implementation
that we experimented against VoIP servers and showed how
cooperating bots can be synchronized to bypass flooding
defense mechanisms. Future works include the investigation
of efficient and scalable defense mechanisms against VoIP
malwares and distributed denial of service attacks.
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